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Abstract 
The paper describes the main determinants of electricity intensity in twenty-
nine transition economies. We provide an original analysis on the way the local 
power sector unreliability may affect the firm-level electricity intensity. The paper 
explains the different firm’s behaviour, within EU and outside EU, in front of 
outages and/or local supply power quality. For this purpose, we use the Business 
Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) done in 2008-2009 
over 2400 enterprises. Moreover, we built an innovative measure of the electricity 
supply quality at the local-level inspired by the previous work of Guiso et al. (2004). 
Our results indicate that in non-EU (or insufficiently reformed) countries power 
sector unreliability increases firm’s electricity intensity. We estimated a potential 
reduction of one-fifth of firm’s electricity intensity associated with an improvement 
from the 75th percentile to the 25th percentile of the distribution of the local power 
sector unreliability. Our results suggest that bad quality of the local power sector 
seems to dampen the firms’ ability to decreases their electricity consumption, if the 
country’s institutional framework is poor.  
 
J.E.L.: P28, Q4, R34 
Key-words: electricity intensity, local power sector, electric power reforms, 
transition economies 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The energy intensity is the crucial question for the next decades. The achievement of a 
sustainable economic growth places at the heart of policy agendas the issue of energy 
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use. And an appropriate use of electricity should not be exerted from an overall sobriety 
effort. First, because of high economic and environmental costs associated with the 
power generation, and second, because of energy security concerns, especially for net 
importers of raw materials needed to electricity production (fuel, gas, coal). This issue is 
all the more important in the case of the countries of Central and South East Europe 
(CSE) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). An inefficient use of 
electricity is a legacy of the Soviet Union (Engoian, 2005). Based on low utilities prices 
and large capacities in the power sector, the planned economy encouraged high level of 
electricity consumption. The structure of the economic activity is thus biased towards 
energy and electricity intensive sectors. Enterprises experience large electricity 
consumption due partly to technology backwards, worn plant and machinery, but also 
behaviour inherited from planned economy. An active energy efficiency policies should 
be considered as a priority for their policymakers, not only for environmental and health 
priorities, but also for the competitiveness of firms.  
In the former command-driven economies poor energy regulatory policies and 
decades of power sector subsidies has failed to stem the power assets deterioration and 
resulted in over-sized energy intensive sectors. This involved a particular pattern of 
transition economies: high level of energy intensities are coupled with low power sector 
performances. This is basically highlighted by the macro-level evidence (see section 3) 
and was often documented in international organization reports (see EBRD, 2009) and 
some academic papers (see Jamasb and Nepal, 2012). 
The main objective of the present work is to test whether we observe this kind of 
evidence at the firm-level. And thus provide a crucial argument in favour of deepen 
power sector reforming in the Former Soviet Union (FSU) and South East European 
(SEE) countries. Indeed, if higher firm electricity intensity is related to a lower quality of 
the power sector, implementing an appropriate power reform path brings a win-win 
situation. That is improving power sector (financial, technical and commercial) 
performances goes hand in hand with decreasing firms’ electricity expenses. 
More precisely, we want to test the relation between the reliability of the local 
electricity supply and firm electricity intensity. We assume that regional electric power 
sector improvements should lower the firm-level power consumption. At first, because 
degraded power utilities sector is the result of power companies’ bad demand-side 
management. Indeed, power companies need to implement necessary actions to change 
the firm electricity consumption behaviours inherited from the planned economy. 
Regions where the quality of the electricity supply is lower are those least able to deal 
with such problems as tariffs beyond the marginal cost, invoices, theft and rubbery, weak 
metric system or contracts favouring intensive consumers. Secondly, because power 
systems characterized by a lower quality are acting as coercive environment to firms’ 
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electricity-conserving investments3. Bad quality of the local power utilities, insufficient 
information as well as low expectations of power price increase thus prevent firms from 
engaging long-term and potentially costly investments. 
We measure the quality of local power sector using subjective and objective questions 
from the BEEPS questionnaire. This survey collects information on firm characteristics 
and their business environment on twenty-nine countries of Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia. Our subjective measure of the local quality of the electricity supply is based on the 
normalized coefficients of the regional dummies in an estimation of firms’ self-declared 
obstacle represented by the electricity sector (see sub-section 5.2.1 for details). We expect 
this indicator to catch the different components of the electricity supply quality. 
Furthermore, in order to take into account for the potential endogeneity bias of this 
measure, we compute an objective assessment of the reliability of the power sector at the 
regional level. This alternative indicator is based on the average number of outages 
declared by firms in each region during the last round of the survey (2007-2009). It 
allows us to control for one particular aspect of the quality of electricity supply, i.e. the 
continuity of supply, computed through the number of interruptions.  
We first assume that all firms follow the same electricity consumption pattern. In a 
second stage we present our results for EU and non-EU enterprises. We divide our 
sample in two subsamples (EU and non-EU firms) and test also for reformed and non-
reformed electricity power supply countries. We assume that firms from EU (or 
reformed country) vs. non-EU countries react differently to electricity supply problems. 
After 15 years of EU integration process (1994-2008), reforms in the electricity sector 
impact the firm electricity consumption. EU pushes the 12 transition economies 
candidates (1994) and than new members (2004-07) to reform substantially their electric 
power sector (see sub-section 3.2). On the opposite, in non EU countries, the over 
investment in the electricity power supply during the communist period was not 
reorganized and still create over capacities. Hence no policies were implemented indoor 
to promote less electric intensive productions. 
The existing literature in these countries focuses on the energy intensity patterns at 
the macro-level (Cornillie and Fankhauser, 2004) or on the effectiveness of power sector 
reforms to improve electricity outputs (Jamasb et al. (2005); Zhang et al. (2008); Jamasb 
and Nepal, (2012)). Still, there is no study on the micro-level determinants of electricity 
intensity, neither on the way the reliability of the power sector is related to the firm’s 
electricity end-use consumption. We try to fill a part of this gap.  
We aim at providing evidence that, in the case of the transition economies, a bad 
quality of the local power sector goes hand in hand with higher firm-level electricity 
                                                        
3 According to CEER (2011), the quality of the power sector supply can be divided into three 
components: continuity of electricity supply (outages), voltage disturbances and commercial 
quality (see sub-section 5.2). 
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intensity. Thus, we also aim to rely on the evidence highlighted by the literature related to 
power sector reforms. Papers focusing on the impact of market-oriented power sector 
reforms found it difficult to establish that reforms had a positive effect on power 
generation capacities but could have a beneficial effect on sector’s productivity and 
capacity use (Zhang et al. (2008); Jamasb and Nepal (2012)). For the special case of 
transition economies, this result could be at least partly explained by a better end-use of 
electricity implied by restructuring of the old power system. In many of these countries, 
reforming bring a better use of the existing generation capacities, with an upgrading of 
the provided service. Improved reliability of the power sector can imply higher electricity 
prices, demand-side management of the consumption and making firm’s electricity 
efficiency investments more profitable. Our findings thus underline the necessity for the 
countries where electricity sector reforms are less implemented to go deeper in the 
reforming process. 
We use an innovative two-steps approach in order to measure the quality of the local 
electricity sector in twenty-nine transition economies. We adapt the approach developed 
by Guiso et al. (2004) who assess the development of the local financial markets in 
different Italian regions. They estimate regional financial development indicators by 
adding regional dummies in the individual subjective assessments of financial obstacle. 
Ranking those regional dummies allows having a good proxy for regional financial 
development. To our knowledge, we are the first to introduce this approach outside of 
the financial markets development concerns. In order to take into account for the quality 
of the electricity sector, we compute a regional indicator reflecting local electric sector 
underdevelopment. The methodological approach of Guiso et al. (2004) seems to be 
particularly fitting for the structure of the electricity sector. Indeed, inside each country, 
we can expect a large variation of the quality of the electricity service depending of the 
local development of the electricity market and infrastructures. 
The contributions of this paper are two-fold. First, it is an important input to the 
relatively scarce literature on the firm-level determinants of electricity intensity in the 
countries of the former Soviet bloc. It underlines the role played by many previously 
used firm characteristic variables. In particular, the firm size, the size of locality, the age, 
the ownership structure and different inputs are taken into account. Second, supporting 
some previous macro-related empirical papers (Cornillie and Fankhauser (2002); Zhang 
et al. (2008); Jamasb and Nepal (2012)), our findings highlight the link between the 
quality of the local power sector and the electricity intensity of firms. Indeed, it seems 
that better quality of the local electricity utilities is related to lower firm-level electricity 
intensity, but only in the countries where power sector reforms are insufficiently 
implemented. Thus, this paper is a complement to the literature of the effect of reforms 
on power sector performances in transition economies. It seems that the lack of reforms 
in the power sector decreases the ability of the power sector to upgrade its network and 
to enhance the quality of the provided service, while maintaining the high firm-level 
electricity consumption. 
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This paper is organized as follows. Next section presents the main contributions of 
the literature as regarding our empirical question. Section 3 addresses an overall overview 
of the electricity sector in our sample of countries and provides the evolutions of their 
power sector reforms. In section 4, we present and discuss the data and the empirical 
strategy. Section 5 discusses in detail our econometric results and finally section 5 
concludes and presents the policy recommendations. 
 
2 LITTERATURE REVIEW 
This paper is at the crossroads of two literatures: the literature on energy intensity and its 
micro-level determinants and the literature on the specificities of the electricity 
distribution utilities and power sector reforms in the former communist countries of 
Europe and Central Asia. However, to our knowledge there are no papers focusing on 
the firm-level electricity intensity in the case of transition countries. By contrast, a 
growing literature examine how firm level characteristics (Fisher-Vanden et al. (2004); 
Bloom et al. (2010); Martin et al. (2012); Morikawa (2012)) or some economic barriers 
(DeCagnio (1998); Brown (2001); Trianni and Cagno (2012)) are related to the energy 
intensity of firms in several developed countries. We focus our attention to the first set 
of papers, which is closer to our empirical strategy. 
Fisher-Vanden et al. (2004) uses a structural model of a Cobb-Douglas cost function 
for the functional form of their estimation to identify drivers determining the decrease in 
energy intensity of 2500 medium and large-sized Chinese industrial firms. From a cost 
minimization program, they derive the firm-level factor demand for energy. They have 
found that changes in relative energy prices and R&D expenditures are the main 
contributors to the decline in firm-level energy intensity. To a lesser extent, shifts in 
output across industry, in ownership and region have contributed to the variation in 
energy intensity.  
The paper of Morikawa (2012) brings another insight about the firms’ energy 
intensity and disentangles the role played by some regional characteristics. In particular, 
the author underlies a positive relationship between population density and the energy 
efficiency consumption in service enterprises. When the population density of the 
locality doubles, the author estimates a 12% decrease of firm-level energy intensity in 
services sector. He also emphasizes a negative link between capital and labour intensities 
and energy efficiency. We try to take into account for this potential effect by adding 
locality size dummies in our empirical estimations. 
Finally, some empirical papers emphasize the crucial role of organizational structures 
and management best practices on enhancing firm-level energy efficiency. Using 
information about firm’s managerial quality and census data containing energy 
consumption expenditures of UK establishments, Bloom et al. (2010) find that better-
managed plants are significantly less energy intensive. This relationship seems to be 
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related to the firm’s productivity. Better-managed firms adopt modern and energy-
efficient measures, which increase their productivity. The authors estimate that an 
improvement from the bottom to the top quartile of their management variable is 
associated with a 17% increase in energy efficiency. The paper of Martin et al. (2012) 
provides further evidence about the negative link between management practices and 
energy intensity. They argue that better management is also related to the firm’s energy 
efficiency innovations (process and product). Moreover, they provide another finding 
about the role played by organizational structure. Firms where energy issues are devoted 
to the environmental manager (when such a position exists) have more climate-friendly 
management practices. As regarding the issues of our paper and the used dataset, our 
empirical approach is inspired by the works of Bloom et al. (2010) and Martin et al. 
(2012). 
Another strand of the literature tries to assess the impact of power sector reforms 
and restructuring on the performances of the electricity sector4. Zhang et al. (2008) look 
at the performances gains related to privatization, competition and regulation reforms in 
the electricity sector in a set of transition and developing countries. They do not observe 
obvious productivity or generation gains related to privatization or regulation reforms, 
but emphasize a positive and significant effects related to competition reforms. The 
paper of Jamasb and Nepal (2012) bring new insights of the market-oriented power 
reforms patterns across the transition countries since 1990. They argue that the impact of 
power sector reforms on power sector, economic and environmental outcomes depend 
on the implementation of wider institutional reforms. Using panel data econometrics, 
they highlight several interesting results. In particular, it seems that the power sector 
reforms have no significant effect on per capita generation installed capacity. Whereas 
the impact is negative on per capita transmission and distribution losses. The effect 
seems to be all the more important when the power reforms are implemented along with 
a more liberalized economy. These results confirm the idea that the countries in the 
former Soviet bloc inherited of excessive generation capacities. Implementing market-
oriented power reforms seemed to enhance the quality of the distribution system and 
allows a better use of the existing generation capacities. The results of our firm-level 
estimations support these findings. Our paper provides an original analysis on the way 
the firm’s electricity intensity could be related to the quality of the local power sector in 
the countries of the former Soviet bloc. Appropriate electricity sector reforms can thus 
improve the quality of the power distribution utilities while also accompanying the firm-
level electricity intensity decrease.  
In the next section, we set the contextual background which provides some 
arguments to our empirical assumptions. 
 
                                                        
4 See Jamasb et al. (2005) for a literature overview of the effects of power sector reforms in 
emerging and developing countries. 
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3 CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND 
In this section we try to present the main mechanisms which can explain a negative 
link between firm-level electricity intensity and the quality of the local power sector. 
First, we briefly describe the scheme of the involved mechanisms. Then, we present the 
macroeconomic background explaining the relationship between electricity intensity, the 
quality of the electricity systems and reforms of the power sector (sub-section 3.1) and 
how far the EU electricity reform model (sub-section 3.2) was implemented in our 
sample of countries (sub-section 3.3). 
During the pre-transition period, overinvestment was predominant in the power 
sector. The electricity system in most countries in transition were heavily subsidized and 
centralized. They were designed to favour and promote heavy industry, provide universal 
access for the population and were characterized by reasonably acceptable service quality. 
But their financial performance was poor because they were not designed for efficiency, 
either in power production or end use. The cost-plus pricing gives no incentive to cut 
waste or remove inefficient technologies. Rigid price controls depress profits and 
discourage new investment. The problem is particularly shape in the former Soviet 
Union (FSU) countries, since the infrastructure was developed on non-market principles 
since a longer time period. As the countries began transitioning to a market economy, 
the design of these electricity distribution utilities often became financially unsustainable. 
The power assets are working significantly beyond their intended life spans. Finally, high 
total losses and poor collection rates, due to weak metering, billing and payment 
collection accounted for the companies’ financial distress. Yet, not all the countries 
implemented the necessary set of reforms in order to restructure the power sector and 
make it efficient. Starting in the 1990s, most EU accession countries and few FSU 
countries have successfully privatized their distribution companies. However, the 
financial situation remains almost unchanged and the financial performance of power 
sector enterprises is poor in most of the countries in the former Soviet bloc (World 
Bank, 2010). 
After the URSS collapse the countries in the former Soviet bloc inherited of large 
power generation capacities and highly electricity intensive economic structures 
(Engoian, 2005). But during the transition process, the lack of financial performance of 
the power sector lead to the depletion of the electricity utilities. Moreover, due to 
insufficient market and out-of-market incentives, the private sector of many of those 
countries still does not rationalize its electricity consumption. Thus, in the countries 
unable to implement appropriate power sector reforms, we observed the emergence of a 
dual problem: falling quality of the provided power services and high level of electricity 
inefficiency of the productive activity. The figure 1 summarizes very roughly the path of 
reforms followed by the former Soviet bloc countries and their consequences. We can 
thus dissociate the EU and non-EU countries (mainly FSU countries). The new members 
of the EU were able to implement the power sector reforms needed to increase the 
financial reliability and thus the overall quality of the sector. These reforms also provide 
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appropriate incentives to rationalize the electricity consumption of the power end-users. 
At the contrary, insufficiently reformed power sectors lead to the depletion of the overall 
reliability of the sector whereas maintain high level of end-use inefficiency and disallows 
individual energy saving investments. The macroeconomic facts presented below (sub-
sections 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3) illustrate this scheme.  
Figure 1: Linkage mechanism between electric power unreliability and firm electricity intensity
Unreformed power sector: 
High commercial losses, low 
prices and subsidies 
Reformed power sector: 
Demand-side management 
and high prices 
Incentives for energy saving 
investments and technologies, 
new deals between electric 
suppliers and consumers 
EU countries Non-EU countries 
No market or out-of-market 
incentives for energy saving 
investments and technologies 
Electric power outages and 
low supply quality  
Unstable and unpredictable 
production process 
Poor financial 
sustainability, obsolete 
power sector assets 
Capital and labor hoarding 
Electricity over consumption 
Less electric intensive 
enterprise outputs 
9 
 
3.1 Power Sector Unreliability and Electricity Intensity: a macro perspective 
We present, first, the electricity intensity data from 1990 to 2009 (World Development 
Indicators, World Bank). The figure 2 shows the results for three groups of countries 
over the region: EU new members, CIS and Mongolia group, and countries from South 
Eastern Europe. The list of countries is displayed in the appendix (see tables 9 and 10).  
Figure 2: Electricity intensity during the period 1990-2009 
 
Notes: The electricity intensity is expressed as the electric power consumption in Kwh per 
constant 2000 US$ (log). Tajikistan & Kyrgyz Republic are excluded; FYR Macedonia & 
Montenegro are missing due to data unavailability. 
Sources: WDI, World Bank, authors’ calculations 
The evolutions in the figure 2 are pretty consistent with the global trends –
convergence– in those economies. Comparing to the rest of the region, the EU new 
members group has the lower electricity intensity. But in recent years, since 2007, we can 
see a stabilization of the electricity intensity evolution. The EU new members are 
converging with one clear outlier: Bulgaria. Bulgaria, and, to a lesser extent, Romania and 
Czech Republic, have not improved so quickly their electricity efficiency (see figure 7 in 
the appendix). Possible reasons are the lack of foreign investment, but also the delay in 
implementing reforms in the electricity sector (see next sub-section). An additional 
reason may be the development of the unrecorded economy, which is using electricity 
without declaring any output (Kaufmann and Kaliberda, 1996).  
South East European countries did not experience the same convergence as EU 
countries. The main reason is probably the wars in former Yugoslavia (1991-1999). 
Serbia is a clear example of war outliers. The war period had created unrecorded 
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economy, electricity smuggling and enormous efficiency losses. In 2009, Serbia is still 
one of the less efficient countries in our sample, due to its implication in three different 
conflicts between 1991and 1999 (see figure 7 in the appendix).  
Finally, CIS countries are by far the less efficient countries among transition 
economies. As in SEE, the countries with an experience of war have the worse results 
(i.e. Tajikistan). But the first period of transition (1990-96) was also, for those economies, 
a shock in terms of electricity intensity. Most of the countries have only improved their 
situation after 1995. It can be noted that there are two outliers – Tajikistan and the 
Kyrgyz Republic – with electricity intensity up to nine times higher than some CIS 
countries.  
Overall, at the end of the period, we observe for all the groups a slow-down or a little 
increase (for SEE) of the power intensity, whereas all these countries are still far from 
the average level of electricity consumption intensity of OECD members. We can also 
notice a break in 1994-1995 of the evolution of electricity intensity and economic growth 
in the whole region. In 2009, the less electricity intensive country (Slovenia) in our 
sample, has still consumed more electricity in order to produce one dollar of production, 
compare to the average of OECD countries (see figure 7 in the appendix). 
Figure 3: Electricity intensity and power losses across transition countries, from 1990 until 2010 
 
Notes: The electricity intensity is expressed as the electric power consumption in Kwh per 
constant 2000 US$ (log). The electric power transmission and distribution losses are expressed in 
percent of output (log). Tajikistan and Albania are considered as outliers so they are excluded. 
Sources: WDI, authors’ calculations. 
Based on cross-country data, we can see in figure 3, that better quality of the electric 
power sector is associated with lower electricity intensity. The figure 3 plots country level 
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scatter plot of the log of electricity intensity against the log of electric power distribution 
and transmission losses (% of output) from 1900 until 2010, across 29 transition 
countries. We can notice a significant positive correlation. This relationship suggests that 
an enhancement of the power sector performances in these countries was positively 
related with a decreasing use of power energy to produce each unit of GDP. Of course a 
number of neglected variables at the country level may induce a potentially misleading 
correlation. That is why it is important to study this correlation more carefully at the 
firm-level, taking the country-wide variation fixed (see section 5 below).  
Figure 4: Electric power losses & the index of power sector reform across transition countries, in 
2008 
 
Notes: Horizontal axis reports the countries displayed by level of power sector reform index 
(EBRD) in 2008, with the lower values at the right of the graph. Vertical axis reports the electric 
power transmission and distribution losses, expressed in percent of output. Missing data for 
Czech Republic. 
Sources: EBRD, WDI, authors’ calculations. 
Our main argument is related to the fact that market-oriented power sector reforms 
aim at increasing the reliability of the power sector and decreasing the initial distortions 
in the power consumption. Thus, figure 4 plots the level of power distribution and 
transmission losses in different countries of our sample. As we can notice, the countries 
with an index of electric power reforms lower or equal to three5, report the higher level 
(and variation) of losses in the power sector in 2008. 
                                                        
5 The EBRD’s indicator of electric power reform catches the extent of market-oriented reforms 
implemented in the power sector in post-soviet area. In each country, the electric power reform 
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The cross-country differences of the electricity sector performance can basically be 
explained by the implement of the reform path proposed by the EU. The countries who 
adopted these reforms are those displaying the higher performances of their electric 
power sector (on the left of the figure). 
3.2 EU Electricity Reform Model 
The EU electric power sector reform framework is based on four main points: the 
creation of an independent sector regulator, legal unbundling of transmission and 
distribution businesses, reduced entry barriers and market opening to competition for all 
customers. The theoretical paradigm of this reform model is thus largely inspired by the 
Single Market agenda: efficient regulation of limited natural monopolies and increased 
competition within the different vertically related stages of production (Politt, 2009). As 
suggested by the theories of regulation (Joscow, 2007), the natural monopoly 
prerogatives are essential, but must be regulated through an independent and unpowered 
control agency. Increased number of firms and reduced entry barriers are also needed in 
order to deepen competition within the stages of production.   
The main characteristics of the EU electricity reform model and its post-soviet 
inherited counterpart is summarized in the table 1. 
Table 1: Electricity market framework for EU and non-EU countries 
 EU Countries Non-EU Countries 
Reformed 
Electricity Sector 
Reformed 
Electricity Sector 
Unreformed 
Electricity Sector 
Industry structure Wholesale competition Wholesale 
competition/Monopoly 
Vertical monopoly 
Independence of the 
regulator 
Fully Partial None 
Transmission/Distribution 
tariff setting 
Price cap/Revenue cap Revenue cap/Cost plus Cost plus 
Transmission and 
distribution unbundling 
Implemented  Legal None 
Transmission/Distribution 
losses and outages 
Low Medium High 
Notes: Based on the Transition Report (EBRD, 2009) and works of Pollitt (2009) and World 
Bank (2010). 
                                                                                                                                                 
index assesses the independence of the electricity regulator, the tariff setting rules and the market 
liberalization of the sector. This index is running from 1 to 5, with higher values indicating a 
deeper implement of market-oriented power reforms. 
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3.3 Power Sector Reform Changes in Transition Economies 
Figure 5 presents the evolution of electric power reforms in transition economies. The 
EU countries (see table 9 in the appendix for the list of countries) do have the best 
results mainly due to the acquis communautaire regulations. However some countries may 
experience a reverse reform process, for example Hungary or Estonia. Most of the 
improvements have been done in the period between the application to EU (1994) and 
the accession (2004-07). 
On the contrary, in South East Europe, the evolution of reforms was unstable, due to 
the wars (1991-1999) in the former Yugoslavia. Many reforms were delayed by five or 
even ten years. The electricity market is still not very transparent in the region, and this 
probably impacts the electricity cost for the enterprises. 
As we can see, countries in the CIS region have experienced very different reform 
path. Most of the Central Asia and South CIS countries have delayed their reforms in the 
electricity sector compared to Russia, and Ukraine. However, we observe some backward 
policies in the region.   
Figure 5: Index of electric power reform in transition countries  
 
Notes: Missing data for Czech Republic and Kosovo. 
Sources: EBRD 2012, Transition indicators, authors’ calculations. 
With inadequate incentives to consumers and inability to reinforce the bill payments, 
the lack of reforms in the power sector favours the development or the maintaining of 
high level of energy consumption by firms. While maintaining high level of firms’ 
electricity consumption, insufficiently implemented reforms can harbour the power 
sector from improving its financial performances. As the generation capacities of power 
utilities were implemented out of the profitability concerns, we should observe that 
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regions where the power sector is the less reliable are also those where the firms’ 
electricity intensity is the higher. 
By using the quality of the electricity service at the local level in our regressions, we 
will try to test whether we observe in some countries of this region a post-soviet trouble 
related to the power energy use. We will try to see if the local power sectors 
characterized by a lower reliability of the provided electricity supply are those unable to 
rationalize the firm-level power consumption. 
 
4 DATA, DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
4.1 Data 
The data presented in the following two sections provide from the Business 
Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS). The European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank create the BEEPS on a 
representative sample of private sector firms in twenty-nine countries from Central 
Europe to Central Asia (for the last round of the BEEPS, in 2008-2009). The survey 
covers a large set of topics, including corruption, access to finance, crime, justice and 
some firm performances measures. Thus, the objective of the BEEPS is to collect firm-
level information in order to assess the influence of enterprise’s characteristics and 
several institutional factors on firm behaviours and performances. There were four 
rounds of survey undertaken since 1999-2000, over a sample of 4000 to around 12000 
firms in 2008-2009. There are a relatively small proportion of observations allowing us to 
build real panel data, especially concerning our research question. Indeed, we are 
constrained to use only the last round of the survey, which includes questions concerning 
firm’s electricity expenses. But all the rounds contain information about regions where 
firms are located, which will be of use to build our indicator of local power supply 
reliability. 
To build the firm-level electricity intensity variable we have used two questions. The 
first one concerning the firm’s electricity consumption: “For fiscal year 2007, please 
provide the following information about this establishment: total annual costs of 
electricity”. The second question concerns the sales turnover: “In fiscal year 2007, what 
where this establishment’s total annual sales?” 6  These two questions allow us to 
construct our dependent variable as the ratio of electricity expenses over total sales 
during the year 2007 (see table 11 in the appendix for detailed description of variables). 
Before analysing econometrically the determinants of firms’ electricity intensity, it is 
informative to look at the raw distribution of our dependent variable as regarding some 
firm characteristics. 
                                                        
6 See the EBRD website for more details about the survey. 
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4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Figure 6 shows the average distribution of firm electricity intensities conditional to the 
locality size, the number of employees, the firm age and the way the firm was established. 
We include these controls in our econometrical analysis. 
As we can see in small cities, the use of electricity is rather inefficient compare to big 
cities. Transition appears to be more “successful” in large cities, where also probably 
technologies and electric sector are more developed.  
Figure 6: Firm characteristics and average electricity intensity from BEEPS (2009) data 
 
Sources: BEEPS survey, 2009, EBRD, authors’ calculations 
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We can also notice that private de novo firms are on average by far the more electricity 
efficient. As expected state-owned and formerly state-owned firms are the more 
electricity intensive, due probably to a weaken budget constraint and remaining 
consumption behaviours from the planned economy system. The privatization of state-
owned firms did not seem to decrease their electricity cost intensity. 
Following the figure, the enterprise’s age affects intensity in two different ways. We 
observe that the more energy intensive firms are at the extremes of the age distribution. 
Enterprises created before the USSR collapse (more than twenty years ago) are more 
electricity intensive maybe due to their overall specialization in energy intensive sectors, 
and also because of inherited obsolete processes and technologies. In the other side, the 
younger firms are also more electricity intensive, probably because of a scale effect 
accompanying a smaller size on average of younger companies. Between those two 
extremes, firms seem to be more electricity efficient without real gaps across the groups.  
Finally the power energy intensity is negatively correlated with firms’ size. Large 
enterprises tend to be more efficient in their use of electricity. Benefitting of economies 
of scale, large firms are more able to implement new technologies and increase their 
overall productivity.  
4.3 Empirical Strategy 
To investigate the determinants of firms’ electricity intensity and assess specific effects of 
power sector and financial constraints, we consider the following econometrical 
specification: 
                                                                            (1) 
where electricity intensity = electricity expenditure over total sales, Y = total sales, L = 
labour (number of employees), K = capital (net book value of machinery, vehicles, 
equipment, land and buildings). Lower case letters indicate natural logarithms, for 
example y = ln(Y). Z is a vector of control variables that could affect electricity intensity, 
i.e. a set of firms’ characteristics (age, share of employees with university degree, ratio of 
current annual sales to annual sales three years ago, way the firm was established) and a 
proxy for population density (dummy variable for the size of the locality). The estimation 
also includes 2-digit industry dummies and country dummies respectively indexed by j 
and c. 
The detailed description of variables is given in the appendix (see table 11). 
There is no selection bias due to the fact that almost no enterprise declares zero 
electricity costs (1.7% answered they have zero electricity costs).   
17 
 
Our specification is based on the approach adopted in the energy related literature7. 
Nevertheless, from our electricity cost share equation a number of concerns might arise.  
Because in the BEEPS dataset we do not have firm specific prices, our dependent 
variable captures both variations in quantities and prices. Electricity intensive firms might 
be able to charge higher prices for their products and thus reducing the electricity cost 
share, as expressed above. In order to take into account such a mark-up effect, we use an 
alternative measure of electricity intensity, the electricity expenditures over variable costs 
(total cost of labour, intermediates, fuel, power and other utilities) as the dependent 
variable.  
Second, to ensure that our results are not driven by the choice of variables used in 
our basic specification we repeat our regressions with an alternative specification. The 
main justification for using the cost share equation (1) is that such a specification is in 
line with the usual translog factor demand equation (Christensen et al. (1971)). But, we 
also try to test our results with another econometrical specification, including a proxy for 
wage and investment measures instead of labour and capital variables.  Using this 2nd 
specification does not change fundamentally our main findings. 
In the following section, we present our first regression’s results and we discuss and 
comment them. 
 
5 RESULTS 
We organise the econometric analysis in the following way: first we present a simple 
specification with and without a management variable (5.1), then we describe and include 
our indicator of the power sector quality at the local level (5.2), and finally we present the 
results for the two sub-samples of EU and non-EU members (5.3). In the last sub-
section we run some sensitivity analysis in order to test the robustness of our findings. 
(5.4)8. 
5.1 Preliminary Regression’s Results (see table 1) 
We have more than 2200 observations on the enterprise level. We use two different 
measures of electricity intensity. We can control for sectors and countries specific effects. 
The results are similar for the electricity intensity and the share of electricity cost. In both 
specifications we include progressively the control variables (firm characteristics, 
settlement size and type of ownership) to check for the stability of the coefficients and 
                                                        
7 Bloom, Genakos, Martin & Sadun (2010); Morikawa (2012); Martin, Muûls, Preux & Wagner 
(2011). 
8 All the variables are in local currency unit, when we use a common currency the results remains 
very similar. Country dummies capture almost all the nominal effects. 
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reliability of our regressions. For all the specifications the coefficients are very stable and 
remain significant. 
We found out that the enterprise number of employees does significantly increase the 
electricity intensity. The number of employees is significant and increases the intensity. 
Furthermore, the amount of capital tends to increase the intensity. Capital and labour 
seems not to be used in order to produce at lower energy costs. It seems that more 
labour and capital intensive firms require more electricity intensive. Similar relationships 
were find by Bloom et al. (2010) and Morikawa (2012) between energy intensity, capital 
and labour variables. Those results also echo the empirical evidence of Berndt and Wood 
(1975) among others. They found that energy and capital are complementary and that 
energy and labour are weakly separable. This last point implies that more employment 
also needs more energy consumption9.  
The age of the firm does not have any statistical significance once we introduce the 
privatization dummies. In fact privatization includes part of the firm age effect. There is 
also probably a non-linear effect of age on the energy intensity (see figure 6).  
A more optimistic result is provided by the sales: larger sales tend to increase the 
intensity. We are probably capturing some economies of scale. In addition, the 
performance of the firm in terms of actual sales compared to three years ago seems to 
reduce the intensity. Higher sales may reflect a higher demand for the firm production. 
On short term, the easier way to address this demand is to use more intensively the 
available capital stock and labour increasing the energy consumption. 
Originally, private firms (de novo) are less spending on electricity per unit sold. This 
finding is strong, significant and stable over all of our estimations. This result echoes 
previous literature treating of the effect of de novo privatization on different variables of 
firm’s performances like growth, productivity, innovation, etc. (Fisher and Sahay, 2000). 
The enterprise performance, in terms of sales, tends to decrease the electricity 
consumption.  
Our paper contributes to the discussion on the management quality and allocation of 
resources; we do not find any significant effect of the management on the electricity 
intensity. This result might differ from the previous studies of Bloom et al. (2010) and 
Martin et al. (2011) because of our proxy of management quality10. 
                                                        
9 There has been extensive research on the substitutability or complementarities between energy 
and other inputs. Unfortunately, our database limitations do not allow us to strongly relate our 
findings to this literature. Indeed, we are unable to deal properly with the issue of elasticity 
between energy and other production factors because we lack input prices information and time-
series data. 
10 The variable of management is a dummy equal to 1 if the establishment has an internationally-
recognized quality certification (like ISO 9000 or 14000 for example). 
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All our results remain stable with or without Russia; this robustness check is 
important since Russia is a much larger country compared to others in our sample. The 
results remain also stable without the enterprises from the services sector. 
5.2 Indicator of Local Power Sector Unreliability 
The energy intensity related literature (Cornillie and Fankhauser, 2004) highlights the role 
played by the electricity sector in maintaining high levels of energy consumption in 
Transition economies. In the same way, the EBRD 2011 special report argues that power 
sector underdevelopment is one of the main drivers explaining electricity inefficiency in 
this region, especially in former Soviet Union countries. Indeed, insufficient reforms and 
underinvestment in the electricity sector could lead to the deterioration of the electric 
power supply. In this case, low electricity price goes hand in hand with low quality of the 
provided service, involving disruptions, inadequate quality and bureaucratic disturbances.  
The quality of the power sector supply can be divided into three components: 
continuity of supply, voltage disturbances and commercial quality (CEER, 2011). The 
continuity of supply refers to the availability of electricity without interruptions –or 
outages (programmed or not). The availability of electricity supply thus affects end-user 
consumers through the number and the duration of power supply interruptions. The 
voltage disturbances represent the adequacy of the technical properties of the supplied 
electricity and its usefulness for consumers. It is basically related to the distortions of 
voltage properties of the supplied electricity from their nominal values (frequency, 
magnitude, wave shape, etc.). The voltage quality impacts on the electricity appliances 
and processes. And it is all the more important for the industrial sector, where proper 
functioning of machines and processes may be severely affected (damages, reduced 
efficiency, breakdowns or even inability to operate). The commercial quality aspect is 
related to the capacity and the speed of the power companies to handle with the 
consumer requests. It concerns such services as repairing quality voltage problems and 
meter verification as well as new connections or adjustment of the connection capacity. 
We can also point out the availability of voltage quality in line with the end-user requests. 
Unfortunately we do not have access to first hand information indicating the quality 
of the local power sector for the whole span of countries. Still, in order to estimate an 
indicator of power sector quality at the local level we can use information contained in 
the BEEPS (EBRD) surveys. Indeed, those surveys were undertaken in order to assess 
the business environment in the countries of the former Soviet bloc. Thus, one of the 
sections of the BEEPS aims to evaluate the electricity access and reliability faced by 
firms. In particular, the BEEPS ask firms whether electricity is an obstacle for their 
current operations. 
Using in our estimation the direct response of the firms’ declared obstacle can lead to 
some endogeneity concerns, as electricity intensive firms might feel more constrained 
when the supply of their main input is problematic. In order to take into account for the 
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quality of electricity supply faced by firms, we compute a regional indicator reflecting 
local electric power unreliability. Regions where the power sector is less reliable are those 
where, ceteris paribus, the declared obstacle in electricity is the higher.  
However, if inside each region the electricity intensive firms are not normally 
distributed, we still might face to the problem of endogeneity. That is why we also use an 
objective measure of the quality of the electricity sector. For doing so, we compute, from 
the last round of the BEEPS survey, the average number of power outages at the 
regional level. This variable is thus based on the number of outages reported by each 
firm of the survey listed in the same region. In this way, this second indicator serves as 
robustness check for our results, because it should not depend, at least positively, on the 
firm-level electricity intensity.  
Using an indicator of regional variation of the power sector quality instead of 
individual measure seems to be particularly fitting for the structure of the electricity 
sector. Indeed, we can expect in a given region all the end-use consumers to face the 
same electric network and the same power generation plants. Inside each country we can 
expect a large variation of the quality of the electricity service depending of the local 
development of the electricity market and infrastructures.  
We follow a two step procedure in order to assess the indicator of local electric 
power sector reliability. Our approach is inspired by the paper of Guiso et al. (2004). 
Distinguishing differences in financial development between different regions of Italy, 
their paper highlights the positive impact of the development of local financial markets 
on several microeconomic variables (competition, entry of new firms, growth). This 
approach computes regional financial development scores by adding region dummies in 
the estimation of individual subjective assessment of the extent of financial access. 
Ranking those regional dummies allows having a good proxy for regional financial 
development. This method has been used by Villegas-Sanchez (2008) to highlight the 
role of local financial markets in externalities conveyed by the FDI.  
To catch up the regional power sector unreliability, we compute the probability that 
electricity is a major obstacle to the current operations of a firm. This first estimation is 
done using pooled cross-sectional data from the last three rounds of the BEEPS (2002, 
2005 and 2009). The information contained in this kind of dependent variable is a 
patchwork of diverse failures and/or malfunctions in the local power sector. It can be 
related to inadequate or insufficient power energy supply as well some “governance” 
shortcomings, as bureaucratic failures or corruption. Thus, we believe that this variable 
contains an individual subjective measure of local power sector reliability.  
5.2.1 Methodology 
We assume that the underlined obstacle faced by enterprises can be described by the 
following econometrical equation: 
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                                                                         (2) 
where “Electricity obstacle” is a dummy variable denoting an obstacle reported by firm i in 
electricity sector. This dummy equals to 1 if a firm reports that electricity is a “very 
severe” or a “major” obstacle to its current operations, and 0 otherwise (“no”, “minor” 
or “moderate” obstacle)11. X is a vector of firm specific attributes that might explain the 
enterprise’s underlying response to the electricity obstacle. In the equation (2) we also 
include year and 2-digit industry dummies respectively indexed by t and j. That allows us 
to control for unobserved year-specific12 and industry-specific factors that impact on the 
dependent variable. 
Our variable of interest is “Region”. Indeed, the measure of local power sector 
unreliability will be the ranking provided by the coefficients γ of the regional dummies k. 
The Imereti region in Georgia provides the higher coefficient of electricity obstacle (see 
sub-section 5.2.2), thus indicating the worth power sector reliability throughout our 
sample and according to our indicator. As a consequence, we set this region as the 
reference region in our estimation (table 2). Comparing to Imereti the coefficients of all 
other regions should display a negative sign. In this way, the minimum regional 
coefficient should indicate the higher quality of the local power sector. For ease of 
interpretation, we transform our regional coefficients into indicator varying between 0 
and 1, indicating local power sector unreliability. Therefore, we normalize the regional 
dummy coefficients as follows: 
                                                                      
  
       
   (3) 
with γk, the coefficient of the region dummy k. 
In the sub-section 5.3 we will add our indicator of local power sector quality in the 
regression of electricity intensity. One of our regressors will thus be estimated from a 
preliminary procedure. Pagan (1984) calls it a “generated regressor”. Using this generated 
regressor in the OLS regression should produce consistent estimates of all parameters, if 
the usual OLS assumption in the population holds—that the error term is uncorrelated 
with the set of explanatory variables (see Wooldridge, 2002, p.115-116). But the statistical 
inference leaves us with a problem due to the sampling variation in the estimated 
coefficients of the generated regressor. The standards errors and test statistics in the 
second step are invalid, because the estimated coefficients of the generated regressor 
depend also on the similar random sample used in the second stage estimation (it is not 
simply introduces heteroskedasticity in the error term). Thus, to make test statistics 
                                                        
11 The related question in the BEEPS is: “Is electricity no obstacle, a minor obstacle, a moderate 
obstacle, a major obstacle, or a very severe obstacle to the current operations of this 
establishment?” 
12 The year dummy variable corresponds to the year in which the was interviewed, but due to 
organizational matters during the BEEPS last round, all the countries were not surveyed during 
the same year (there are only 17 over 29 countries surveyed in 2009). 
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asymptotically valid in the second stage procedure, we need to compute an adjustment to 
the common variance matrix estimate that accounts for the variability in the estimated 
coefficients of the generated regressor. We use a popular resampling method, i.e. 
bootstrapping, for obtaining standards errors, confidence intervals and p-values for test 
statistics.  
5.2.2 Estimation (see table 2) 
In table 2 we have estimated, from the base of BEEPS 2002, 2005 and 2009, an indicator 
of regional power sector quality. We compute, with a probit model, the probability that 
electricity is a major or very severe obstacle to the current operations of a firm. The 
choice of the specification is based on the existing literature13 . We include industry 
dummies in the estimation to control for sector-specific characteristics possibly 
influencing firms’ differentiated needs in electricity input.  
Our results do not exhibit strong evidence about the impact of the firms’ specific 
characteristics. Larger and older firms do not report a lower constraint of the access to 
electricity supply. However, firms declaring payments overdue for utilities tend to report 
significantly higher electricity obstacle. This is probably because non-paying enterprises 
get disconnected or because payments arrears are related to insufficiently reformed 
electricity sector. We have also added in our estimation year dummies to capturing some 
year’s fixed effects. We can see that in the last round of the BEEPS (2009), firms report 
significantly higher electricity obstacle. In addition, we have included in our estimate 
regional dummies, capturing power sector quality differences across different regions 
inside each country. Comparing to the reference region (Imereti, in Georgia) all other 
local dummies display a negative and significant coefficient14. In order to obtain the 
indicator of local electricity reliability, we have normalized the regional dummy 
coefficients as explained in the previous sub-section. The increase of this variable 
indicates thus a decreasing quality of the electricity supply at the local level. Finally, our 
indicator of local power sector reliability covers 137 regions in twenty-nine countries. 
5.2.3 Local power unreliability and firm-level electricity intensity 
In this last sub-section, we try to test whether firms facing higher regional unreliability of 
the power sector experience higher electricity intensity. We first introduce two different 
measures of the electricity sector quality on the whole sample, before testing our main 
assumption by splitting the sample according to the level of institutional reforms of the 
                                                        
13  Gelb et al. (2007) estimated for example the firms’ perceptions of some environmental 
constraints, including electricity. The paper by Vagliasindi (2004) analyzes the development of 
electricity infrastructures in transition economies using the information of BEEPS 2002 database. 
Highlighting some macroeconomic aspects determining the quality of electricity infrastructures, 
the author also uses several firm characteristic variables to explain the number of power outages 
faced by enterprises. 
14 Except the Durres region (in Georgia) which is not significantly different from Imereti. We 
thus set its value to 0, as Imereti. 
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countries. The splitting is thus based on the EU belonging (see tables 5, 6 and 8) or 
alternatively to the extent of market-oriented power sector reforms undertaken in the 
countries (see below the robustness checks). 
Main results (tables 3 and 4) 
In tables 3 and 4, we present the results of the regression where we include the quality of 
the electricity service at the local level – measured using subjective and objective 
questions from BEEPS.  
Our main finding is that, for the whole sample, lower reliability of the power sector 
has a positive but not significant effect on electricity consumption at the enterprise level. 
However, when we use our objective indicator of the power unreliability (table 4), the 
relationship becomes positive. As previously argued we expect the relationship between 
firm electricity intensity and the local power sector quality to be different as regarding the 
level of appropriate reforms introduced in a given country. Thus, throughout the whole 
sample the impact of the local power sector quality should not exert any significant 
effect. Indeed, the positive effect found in the table 4 is probably due to the weight of 
the countries with lower level of power sector reforms (about 2/3 of the firms in the 
sample). To take it into account we thus split our sample according to two basic 
indicators of institutional reforms: the belonging or not to the EU (tables 5, 6 and 8) and 
the extent of market-oriented reforms in the power sector (table 7). 
Going into the details (see tables 5 and 6) 
As we observe in figures 1, 3 and 4, EU new members implemented new reforms 
(EBRD index) in the power sector and achieved better performance in the electricity 
consumption. We think that firms behave differently according to the institutional 
framework they belong to. Hence we use the same specification as in table 3 and 4 but 
we split our sample in EU and non-EU members in 2008 (for the list of countries see 
table 9). Table 5 reports our main results. Column 1 simply regresses electricity intensity 
on local power sector unreliability, controlling for labour and capital use and potential 
scale effects. Outside the EU, lower quality of the local electricity supply is positively and 
significantly associated with higher electricity intensity. We introduce firm controls in 
column 2 and the form of ownership in column 3. The coefficient of power sector 
unreliability is not significantly affected by their inclusion although its size is somewhat 
lower once we introduce the private de novo dummy (originally private, from start-up). 
Interestingly, the introduction of locality size dummies (column 4) does not decrease 
substantially the point estimate of our main variable of interest. There should be clearly 
partial correlation between our indicator of local electricity unreliability and the locality 
size. But surprisingly the estimated effect remains almost unchanged, whereas its 
significance is slightly lower. The effect of local power sector unreliability on electricity 
intensity is thus not simply explained by the variability of the population density 
(Morikawa, 2012). 
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The size of the estimated effect is substantial. Following the table 5, an improving of 
the local power sector unreliability from the bottom quartile (the higher reliability of 
electricity sector) to the top quartile (the worst reliability of electricity sector) predicts a 
19.7 percentage points increase in the firm level electricity intensity 15 . Overall, the 
estimated effect runs from 20.7% (column 2) to 19.5% (column 4). Increasing the local 
electricity quality indicator from the 75th to 50th percentile is still associated with a 9% 
reduction of firm-level electricity intensity16.  
In table 5, regression results are straightforward. If you are part of EU the 
unreliability of the power sector pushes the enterprise to decrease their electricity 
intensity. On the contrary, if an enterprise is not from a new member country the worse 
is the quality greater is the electric intensity. All other control variable’s coefficients 
remain similar compared to table 4 except for the share of employees with a degree. In 
the EU, and only in the EU, this share of educated people in the firm reduces the 
electricity intensity. 
Nevertheless, our result might be affected by a reverse causality bias if one believes 
that in some regions electricity intensive firms are over-represented, regardless of their 
industrial sector. Firms in these regions declaring on average a higher electricity obstacle, 
because they are more affected. In order to deal with this issue we compute an 
alternative indicator of the local electricity supply quality. The average number of 
electricity interruptions should provide a good proxy of the continuity of power supply 
at the local level. Indeed, this indicator is based on an objective measure and should 
arguably be independent of firm-specific and unobservable technology.   
We observe very similar results for all the variables when we use the regional mean 
outage number as a proxy for the quality of the power sector (table 6).  Except for EU 
countries where the number of outages is not significant. This is probably due to the 
scarcity of significant outage occurrences. Following our results, the accuracy of one 
more outage in the region is related to 1% increase of firm-level electricity intensity in 
countries not belonging to the EU. Moreover, this result suggests that worst continuity 
of supply seems to dampen firm-level electricity inefficiency. But this effect is probably 
related to long, or even very long, interruptions. That is why there is no significant 
positive, neither negative, impact in the EU countries. In the EU area, the declared 
outages should be of lower duration.17 
                                                        
15  The estimated effect is given by: [exp(0.195*0.922)-1]*100 = 19.7%, where 0.195 is the 
interquartile range of the local power sector unreliability indicator and 0.922 is the coefficient of 
this indicator in table 5, column 3.  
16 The estimated effect is given with the same computation as previously but an interquartile range 
of the local power sector unreliability indicator of 0.093.  
17 In the countries belonging to the EU, power outages endure on average less than 3 hours, 
whereas in the rest of our sample this number up to more than 5 hours (own calculations, based 
on BEEPS( 2009)). 
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From our empirical study we learned that poor institutional quality and poor local 
power sector quality increase the electricity intensity. In the next paragraph we present 
some robustness checks. 
Robustness tests (tables 7 and 8) 
We present two robustness tests: we first change the subsample division. We divide our 
sample in reformed and unreformed power sector countries (table 7). In the second 
check we change the specification of our model and test the share of electricity cost in 
total variable costs instead of the electricity intensity. 
For the first robustness check, we assume that the negative effect of the local 
electricity sector underdevelopment on electricity intensity is based on the level of 
institutional reforms undertaken in the power sector. Indeed, insufficiently reformed 
power sector is characterized by tariff below the cost recovery, inadequate supply and 
bad infrastructures. Thus, insufficient reforms will lead at the same time to firms’ 
electricity over-consumption and a bad quality of the provided service. We expect to find 
a negative impact of local electricity quality (measured by our subjective and objective 
variables) on electricity intensity. For this purpose we split our sample according to the 
level of undertaken power reforms in 2008 as indicated by the EBRD reform indicator 
(see section 3.2).  
The threshold level is 3: insufficiently reformed = [2;3] and “well” reformed = ]3;4]. 
The choice of this threshold is based on two different reasons. We believe that an 
insufficiently reformed power sector corresponds to an indicator equal or inferior to 318. 
And, it may be noted that almost all the new EU members are comprised in the “well” 
reformed group, except Slovenia. 
When we divide the sample in subsamples, according to the quality of the reforms in 
the electricity sector, we find very interesting and convincing results (table 7). If one is in 
the group of countries without doing reforms in the power sector (columns 1 to 4 in the 
table 7), the local unreliability of electric utilities is increasing the electricity intensity. 
Thus, following column 2, moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile of the local power 
sector unreliability distribution predicts a 26.3 percentage points increase in the firm level 
electricity intensity19. The magnitude of the predicted effect is thus even larger than the 
one we found for our main specification (table 5). The effect of the local power sector 
quality is not significant anymore if one is in the group of countries implementing the 
power sector reforms (columns 5 to 8). This provides micro-level evidences that 
                                                        
18 The power sector is still a state-owned monopoly, the rules for cost-reflective tariff setting are 
not formulated or implemented and there is no regulator, at least an independent one. 
19  The estimated effect is given by: [exp(0.221*1.058)-1]*100 = 26.3%, where 0.221 is the 
interquartile range of the local power sector unreliability indicator and 1.058 is the coefficient of 
this indicator in table 7, column 2.  
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insufficiently reformed power sector is associated with a higher use of electricity by 
firms. 
In our second robustness check we present an alternative specification. Our 
dependent variable is changed. Indeed, all other things equal, firms with higher mark-up 
will display higher electricity intensity, and our indicator of power quality may affect the 
dependent variable only through the denominator. We use a cost structure variable in 
order to check if, in the previous regressions, the sales’ variations are not driving all our 
results. All the firm’s characteristics remain significant and stable compared to our main 
specification (electricity intensity). For non-EU countries, poor local electric power 
quality, both in terms of outages and perceptions, increases the electricity cost share in 
total variable costs.  
 
6 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
In light of the growing importance of the energy issue in the former Soviet bloc 
countries, this study empirically analysed the role played by the local power sector 
unreliability in maintaining high firm-level electricity intensity. Based on micro-level 
survey of twenty-nine countries from Central Europe to Central Asia, we provide further 
insight about the necessity for non-EU countries to push ahead with deeper reforms in 
the power sector. For this purpose, and inspired by the previous work of Guiso et al. 
(2004), we built an innovative measure of the electricity supply quality at the local-level. 
A bad quality of the local power sector seems to dampen the firms’ ability to decreases 
their electricity consumption, if the country’s institutional framework is poor.  
Our main findings both for subjective and objective (outages) measures of local 
electric power supply unreliability are consistent. EU countries of Central Europe are 
able to provide appropriate incentives to the firm’s electricity consumption behaviour. In 
this sense, our results indicate that bad reliability of the local power supply is negatively 
related to firm-level electricity intensity. At the contrary, in non-EU (or insufficiently 
reformed) countries power sector unreliability increases firm’s electricity intensity. The 
size of the estimated effect is substantial. We estimated about a 20% percent potential 
reduction of firm’s electricity intensity associated with an improvement from the 75th 
percentile to the 25th percentile of the distribution of the local power sector unreliability 
variable.  
Countries of the former Soviet bloc needs to reform in order to increase the electric 
utilities reliability and avoid the planned economy legacy of the power sector functioning. 
Given our results, deeper power sector reforming should bring to FSU and SEE 
countries a win-win solution, increasing power companies’ financial performances and 
firm electricity expenses.  
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Our results have some policy implication: if transition countries want to improve the 
firm’s energy efficiency, they need to create incentives for new investments and promote 
high labour productivity activities. Transition countries also need to improve the quality 
of electricity supply at the local level, especially when the power sector is not reformed. 
To make it happen, a detailed assessment of the local supply continuity should be 
established by an independent regulator. 
Our policy recommendations are in line with the World Bank reports of 2012 and 
2010 and the EBRD report 2011. Broadly speaking, countries of the former Soviet bloc 
need to prioritize the electricity efficiency measures in their political agendas. The set of 
basic power sector reforms should be reinforced. In particular, cost-recovery tariffs and 
strong independent regulatory authority must be established. 
These broad elements should be combined with more specific reforms. To improve 
the quality of electricity supply, the financial reliability of power companies should be 
increased and generation capacities should be offset. Their business strategies should 
focus on the demand-side management and favour extensive margins (new connections) 
instead of intensive margins (larger energy consumers). For this purpose, power sector 
bureaucratic barriers for new connections must be reduced and broad-based voltage 
scope should be provided to ensure the good functioning of electricity-saving 
equipments. Moreover, an appropriate metering system is substantial: to improve 
demand-side management, decrease power companies commercial losses and ensure 
individual voltage quality verification.  
In order to make a smooth, but sustained, transition towards a more efficient use of 
electricity, firm-oriented measures should also be undertaken. Thus, financial access for 
electricity-saving investments must be improved. And reliable information about these 
investments and their profitability should be provided. 
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Table 1: Preliminary regressions - electricity intensity determinants (OLS)  
Log elec. cost over total sales (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Log total sales -0.711 -0.669 -0.661 -0.661 -0.662 
 (27.58)*** (25.35)*** (25.31)*** (25.15)*** (24.27)*** 
Log number employees 0.585 0.539 0.505 0.503 0.490 
 (16.04)*** (14.33)*** (13.28)*** (13.10)*** (12.00)*** 
Log capital stock 0.139 0.124 0.122 0.122 0.121 
 (7.46)*** (6.28)*** (6.17)*** (6.12)*** (5.90)*** 
Management quality certification     0.096 
     (1.60) 
Firm controls      
      
Firm age  0.004 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (2.91)*** (0.80) (0.77) (0.46) 
Share of employees with degree  -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
  (1.15) (1.01) (0.98) (0.96) 
Log enterprise performance  -0.078 -0.075 -0.075 -0.066 
  (2.79)*** (2.63)*** (2.64)*** (2.31)** 
Way the firm was established (ref=State owned/Privatization of a state owned)   
      
Originally private, from start-up   -0.344 -0.341 -0.368 
   (5.32)*** (5.15)*** (5.53)*** 
Priv. subsid. of former state owned   -0.247 -0.246 -0.227 
   (1.29) (1.26) (1.14) 
Joint venture with foreign partner   -0.085 -0.079 -0.177 
   (0.53) (0.49) (1.06) 
Other type of establishment   -0.223 -0.225 -0.260 
   (1.06) (1.06) (1.22) 
Size of locality dummy (ref=Capital city)      
      
Over 1 million – other than capital    0.056 0.032 
    (0.54) (0.31) 
Over 250.000 to 1 million    -0.078 -0.099 
    (0.79) (0.98) 
50.000 to 250.000    0.065 0.046 
    (0.87) (0.59) 
Less than 50.000    0.025 0.014 
    (0.33) (0.17) 
Industry dummy YES YES YES YES YES 
Country dummy YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant 4.457 4.460 4.821 4.840 5.220 
 (11.10)*** (7.95)*** (8.27)*** (8.22)*** (9.95)*** 
R2 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.36 
N 2,723 2,346 2,344 2,344 2,261 
Robust standard errors clustered by country-industry in brackets.  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on BEEPS (2009) data.
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Table 2: Individual electricity obstacle estimation (Probit) 
Payments overdue for utilities 0.103 
 (1.74)* 
Log number employees 0.011 
 (1.31) 
Firm age 0.000 
 (0.40) 
Way the firm was established   
  
Privatized of a state-owned -0.065 
 (1.92)* 
State-owned -0.152 
 (1.15) 
Year dummy (ref=2002)  
  
2005 0.165 
 (0.74) 
2008 1.336 
 (5.77)*** 
2009 1.447 
 (6.43)*** 
Constant -0.534 
 (1.96)* 
Region dummies  YES 
Industry dummies YES 
Pseudo R² 0.194 
N 18,451 
Robust standard errors clustered by country-industry in brackets.  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
Notes: Reference region: Imereti, Georgia 
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on BEEPS (2002, 2005 and 2009) data. 
Number of observations for the electricity obstacle variable: 
electricity obstacle dummy=1 3,963 
electricity obstacle dummy=0 14,488 
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Table 3: Electricity intensity and subjective local power sector quality (OLS) 
Log elec. cost over total sales (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log total sales -0.722 -0.683 -0.675 -0.675 
 (27.16)*** (24.09)*** (23.27)*** (24.99)*** 
Log number employees 0.589 0.550 0.514 0.513 
 (14.95)*** (14.15)*** (13.14)*** (12.85)*** 
Log capital stock 0.142 0.129 0.127 0.127 
 (7.39)*** (5.97)*** (6.00)*** (6.04)*** 
Local power sector unreliability 0.410 0.380 0.330 0.340 
 (1.44) (1.20) (1.04) (1.04) 
Firm controls     
     
Firm age  0.003 0.000 0.000 
  (2.04)** (0.25) (0.21) 
Share of employees with degree  -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 
  (1.56) (1.31) (1.25) 
Log enterprise performance  -0.068 -0.065 -0.065 
  (2.39)** (2.17)** (2.17)** 
Way the firm was established (ref=State owned/Privatization of a state owned)  
     
Originally private, from start-up   -0.352 -0.350 
   (4.61)*** (4.95)*** 
Priv. subsid. of former state owned   -0.281 -0.280 
   (1.38) (1.39) 
Joint venture with foreign partner   -0.056 -0.051 
   (0.31) (0.31) 
Other type of establishment   -0.220 -0.221 
   (1.01) (0.96) 
Size of locality dummy (ref=Capital city)     
     
Over 1 million – other than capital    0.041 
    (0.40) 
Over 250.000 to 1 million    -0.094 
    (0.89) 
50.000 to 250.000    0.044 
    (0.51) 
Less than 50.000    0.030 
    (0.36) 
Industry dummy YES YES YES YES 
Country dummy YES YES YES YES 
Constant 3.903 4.568 4.879 4.916 
 (7.61)*** (8.48)*** (8.96)*** (9.37)*** 
R2 0.36 0.35 0.36 0.36 
N 2,468 2,110 2,108 2,108 
Bootstrapped standard errors in brackets (non-parametric bootstrap with 500 replications) 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on BEEPS (2009) data. 
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Table 4: Electricity intensity and objective local power sector quality (OLS) 
Log elec. cost over total sales (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Log total sales -0.711 -0.710 -0.668 -0.661 -0.661 
 (27.58)*** (27.48)*** (25.28)*** (25.27)*** (25.12)*** 
Log number employees 0.585 0.584 0.538 0.504 0.503 
 (16.04)*** (16.02)*** (14.30)*** (13.25)*** (13.08)*** 
Log capital stock 0.139 0.139 0.124 0.123 0.122 
 (7.46)*** (7.51)*** (6.32)*** (6.22)*** (6.17)*** 
Regional mean outages number  0.013 0.013 0.011 0.011 
  (2.82)*** (3.02)*** (2.73)*** (2.51)** 
Firm controls      
      
Firm age   0.004 0.001 0.001 
   (2.91)*** (0.82) (0.78) 
Share of employees with degree   -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
   (1.15) (1.02) (1.01) 
Log enterprise performance   -0.078 -0.075 -0.075 
   (2.78)*** (2.61)*** (2.63)*** 
Way the firm was established (ref=State owned/Privatization of a state owned)   
      
Originally private, from start-up    -0.341 -0.339 
    (5.24)*** (5.10)*** 
Priv. subsid. of former state owned    -0.246 -0.246 
    (1.29) (1.26) 
Joint venture with foreign partner    -0.084 -0.079 
    (0.52) (0.49) 
Other type of establishment    -0.220 -0.223 
    (1.05) (1.05) 
Size of locality dummy (ref=Capital city)      
      
Over 1 million – other than capital     0.047 
     (0.45) 
Over 250.000 to 1 million     -0.090 
     (0.90) 
50.000 to 250.000     0.048 
     (0.64) 
Less than 50.000     0.014 
     (0.18) 
Industry dummy YES YES YES YES YES 
Country dummy YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant 4.457 4.065 4.024 4.425 4.472 
 (11.10)*** (9.89)*** (6.96)*** (7.36)*** (7.38)*** 
R2 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.36 
N 2,723 2,723 2,346 2,344 2,344 
Robust standard errors clustered by country-industry in brackets.  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on BEEPS (2009) data. 
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Table 5: Electricity intensity and subjective local power sector quality: EU vs. non-EU (OLS) 
Log elec. cost over total sales (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Non-EU Non-EU Non-EU Non-EU EU EU EU EU 
Log total sales -0.732 -0.691 -0.678 -0.681 -0.688 -0.668 -0.684 -0.684 
 (27.45)*** (23.83)*** (23.81)*** (22.60)*** (8.91)*** (7.87)*** (8.18)*** (8.38)*** 
Log number employees 0.606 0.568 0.530 0.532 0.517 0.500 0.480 0.501 
 (14.35)*** (13.63)*** (12.16)*** (11.68)*** (5.38)*** (4.93)*** (4.69)*** (4.91)*** 
Log capital stock 0.127 0.114 0.111 0.111 0.188 0.169 0.171 0.164 
 (5.59)*** (4.54)*** (4.49)*** (4.39)*** (5.63)*** (4.55)*** (4.60)*** (4.34)*** 
Local power sector unreliability 0.939 0.963 0.922 0.912 -1.035 -1.189 -1.322 -1.389 
 (3.04)*** (2.62)*** (2.73)*** (2.49)** (1.93)* (1.99)** (2.09)** (1.99)** 
Firm controls         
         
Firm age  0.003 -0.000 -0.000  0.002 0.001 0.001 
  (1.96)** (0.01) (0.09)  (0.71) (0.28) (0.32) 
Share of employees with degree  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001  -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 
  (0.74) (0.46) (0.63)  (2.11)** (2.02)** (1.70)* 
Log enterprise performance  -0.064 -0.061 -0.061  -0.084 -0.073 -0.069 
  (2.15)** (2.03)** (1.96)*  (1.00) (0.81) (0.78) 
Way the firm was established (ref=State owned/Privatization of a state owned)  
         
Originally private, from start-up   -0.363 -0.361   -0.341 -0.326 
   (4.42)*** (3.92)***   (2.79)*** (2.70)*** 
Priv. subsid. of former state owned   -0.378 -0.377   0.247 0.357 
   (1.98)** (1.99)**   (0.36) (0.53) 
Joint venture with foreign partner   -0.104 -0.091   0.099 0.100 
   (0.53) (0.45)   (0.50) (0.46) 
Other type of establishment   -0.283 -0.293   -0.188 -0.155 
   (0.90) (0.88)   (0.52) (0.48) 
Size of locality dummy (ref=Capital city)        
         
Over 1 million – other than capital    -0.005    -0.074 
    (0.05)    (0.16) 
Over 250.000 to 1 million    -0.214    0.416 
    (1.81)*    (1.74)* 
50.000 to 250.000    0.063    -0.105 
    (0.66)    (0.61) 
Less than 50.000    -0.039    0.071 
    (0.36)    (0.44) 
Industry dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant 3.826 4.614 4.872 5.053 2.052 2.163 2.848 2.873 
 (6.52)*** (8.18)*** (8.35)*** (8.43)*** (2.52)** (2.36)** (2.98)*** (2.79)*** 
R2 0.38 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.30 0.33 0.34 0.34 
N 1,825 1,543 1,541 1,541 643 567 567 567 
Bootstrapped standard errors in brackets (non-parametric bootstrap with 500 replications) 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on BEEPS (2009) data. 
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Table 6: Electricity intensity and objective local power sector quality: EU vs. non-EU (OLS) 
Log elec. cost over total sales (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Non-EU Non-EU Non-EU Non-EU EU EU EU EU 
Log total sales -0.715 -0.672 -0.660 -0.663 -0.690 -0.664 -0.679 -0.681 
 (26.81)*** (25.04)*** (24.91)*** (25.10)*** (9.10)*** (7.90)*** (8.04)*** (8.04)*** 
Log number employees 0.598 0.552 0.517 0.518 0.519 0.493 0.473 0.489 
 (15.50)*** (14.36)*** (13.30)*** (13.15)*** (5.41)*** (4.78)*** (4.57)*** (4.70)*** 
Log capital stock 0.125 0.112 0.108 0.108 0.191 0.170 0.172 0.168 
 (5.88)*** (4.94)*** (4.80)*** (4.70)*** (5.83)*** (4.64)*** (4.62)*** (4.50)*** 
Regional mean outages number 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.011 -0.001 -0.010 -0.011 -0.034 
 (2.99)*** (3.44)*** (3.12)*** (2.70)*** (0.03) (0.28) (0.32) (0.90) 
Firm controls         
         
Firm age  0.004 0.001 0.001  0.003 0.002 0.002 
  (2.91)*** (0.72) (0.62)  (0.99) (0.53) (0.58) 
Share of employees with degree  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000  -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 
  (0.22) (0.07) (0.25)  (2.29)** (2.21)** (1.75)* 
Log enterprise performance  -0.074 -0.071 -0.072  -0.094 -0.085 -0.077 
  (2.52)** (2.40)** (2.43)**  (1.16) (0.99) (0.89) 
Way the firm was established (ref=State owned/Privatization of a state owned)  
         
Originally private, from start-up   -0.349 -0.348   -0.323 -0.304 
   (4.61)*** (4.37)***   (2.58)** (2.46)** 
Priv. subsid. of former state owned   -0.346 -0.348   0.173 0.315 
   (1.95)* (1.92)*   (0.27) (0.48) 
Joint venture with foreign partner   -0.137 -0.124   0.101 0.120 
   (0.71) (0.65)   (0.51) (0.60) 
Other type of establishment   -0.271 -0.287   -0.167 -0.106 
   (0.95) (0.99)   (0.53) (0.34) 
Size of locality dummy (ref=Capital city)        
         
Over 1 million – other than capital    0.007    0.013 
    (0.06)    (0.03) 
Over 250.000 to 1 million    -0.206    0.573 
    (1.91)*    (2.49)** 
50.000 to 250.000    0.081    0.059 
    (0.92)    (0.39) 
Less than 50.000    -0.049    0.196 
    (0.52)    (1.42) 
Industry dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant 4.342 4.189 4.556 4.681 1.557 1.568 2.151 2.038 
 (10.09)*** (7.11)*** (7.48)*** (7.60)*** (1.91)* (1.72)* (2.20)** (2.08)** 
R2 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.29 0.32 0.33 0.34 
N 2,075 1,775 1,773 1,773 648 571 571 571 
Robust standard errors clustered by country-industry in brackets.  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on BEEPS (2009) data. 
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Table 7: Electricity intensity and objective/subjective local power sector quality: well/insufficiently reformed power 
sector (OLS) 
Log elec. cost over total sales (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Insufficiently reformed power sector Well reformed power sector 
Log total sales -0.753 -0.680 -0.728 -0.655 -0.692 -0.678 -0.691 -0.678 
 (20.35)*** (18.01)*** (20.45)*** (19.11)*** (18.86)*** (16.71)*** (19.17)*** (16.92)*** 
Log number employees 0.689 0.597 0.665 0.562 0.514 0.469 0.513 0.464 
 (12.91)*** (11.32)*** (13.87)*** (11.75)*** (9.91)*** (8.43)*** (9.90)*** (8.24)*** 
Log capital stock 0.110 0.086 0.111 0.085 0.159 0.153 0.160 0.155 
 (3.55)*** (2.79)*** (4.12)*** (3.24)*** (6.41)*** (5.48)*** (6.34)*** (5.49)*** 
Local power sector unreliability 0.833 1.058   0.112 -0.283   
 (2.17)** (2.79)***   (0.30) (0.66)   
Regional mean outages number   0.016 0.015   -0.030 -0.051 
   (4.39)*** (4.33)***   (0.87) (1.70)* 
Firm controls NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Way the firm was established NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Size of locality dummy NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Industry dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant 4.362 5.213 4.556 4.557 0.706 1.324 0.859 1.186 
 (6.40)*** (6.40)*** (8.30)*** (6.66)*** (1.80)* (2.78)*** (2.47)** (3.07)*** 
R2 0.42 0.40 0.41 0.39 0.29 0.33 0.29 0.34 
N 1,023 871 1,271 1,101 1,445 1,237 1,452 1,243 
Bootstrapped standard errors in brackets (non-parametric bootstrap with 500 replications) in columns 1, 2, 5, 6 
Robust standard errors clustered by country-industry in brackets in columns 3, 4, 7, 8 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on BEEPS (2009) data. 
Table 8: Share of Electricity cost and objective/subjective local power sector quality: EU vs. non-EU – alternative 
specification (OLS) 
Log elec. cost over total var. cost (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Non-EU Non-EU Non-EU Non-EU EU EU EU EU 
Log total sales -0.381 -0.383 -0.378 -0.377 -0.345 -0.414 -0.349 -0.413 
 (11.85)*** (10.50)*** (12.32)*** (11.07)*** (4.88)*** (6.14)*** (5.21)*** (6.21)*** 
Log number employees 0.268 0.224 0.270 0.219 0.242 0.278 0.242 0.265 
 (6.10)*** (5.00)*** (6.56)*** (5.18)*** (2.84)*** (3.29)*** (2.88)*** (3.02)*** 
Log capital stock 0.073 0.071 0.078 0.077 0.112 0.106 0.115 0.111 
 (3.12)*** (2.74)*** (3.63)*** (3.21)*** (3.76)*** (3.31)*** (3.69)*** (3.30)*** 
Local power sector unreliability 0.812 0.812   -0.977 -1.272   
 (2.40)** (2.25)**   (1.58) (1.77)*   
Regional mean outages number   0.012 0.009   0.016 -0.023 
   (2.53)** (1.87)*   (0.49) (0.73) 
Firm controls NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Way the firm was established NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Size of locality dummy NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Industry dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant 0.187 1.194 0.825 1.653 -0.673 0.696 -1.203 -0.086 
 (0.37) (1.66)* (1.70)* (2.81)*** (0.92) (0.79) (1.64) (0.11) 
R2 0.20 0.22 0.19 0.21 0.17 0.23 0.17 0.22 
N 1,709 1,456 1,955 1,685 598 533 603 537 
Bootstrapped standard errors in brackets (non-parametric bootstrap with 500 replications) in columns 1, 2, 5, 6 
Robust standard errors clustered by country-industry in brackets in columns 3, 4, 7, 8 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on BEEPS (2009) data. 
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Table 9. Countries included in the study  
EU new members in 2008 South Eastern  
Europe (SEE)  
 
Commonwealth of  
Independent States  
(CIS)  
Bulgaria*, Czech Republic, 
Estonia*, Hungary*, Latvia*,  
Lithuania, Poland*, 
Romania*, Slovak Republic*  
and Slovenia*  
Albania***, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina***, 
Croatia**, FYR Macedonia** ,  
Serbia***, Montenegro*** and 
Turkey ** 
 
Armenia, Azerbaijan,  
Belarus, Georgia,  
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan,  
Turkmenistan, Ukraine  
and Uzbekistan  
*EU new members, ** EU candidates and *** Potential EU candidates 
 
Table 10: List of countries included in the OECD mean calculation 
Counterfactual: High Income OECD members For ease of comparison the following 
OECD members were excluded: 
Australia, Austria*, Belgium*, Canada, Denmark*, 
Finland*, France*, Germany*, Greece*, Iceland, 
Ireland*, Israel, Italy*, Japan, Korea Republic, 
Luxembourg*, Netherlands*, New Zealand, 
Norway, Portugal*, Spain*, Sweden*, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom*, United States 
Czech Republic*, Chile, Estonia*, 
Hungary*, Mexico, Slovak Republic*, 
Slovenia*  
*EU members 
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Table 11: Description of variables  
Variable Definition/description Related label 
in the BEEPS 
Expected 
sign 
Log electricity intensity Logarithm of the ratio of electricity expenses to sales  n2f/d2  
Log  total sales Logarithm of the total sales d2 - 
Log number employees Logarithm of the number of employees  l1 + 
Log capital stock Logarithm of the net book value of the capital (n6a + n6b) + 
Firm age  Difference between the firm year creation and the year 
of the survey 
a14y - b5 + 
Share of employees with 
degree 
Percent of university level employees in total 
employment 
ecaq69 - 
Log enterprise 
performance 
Logarithm of the ratio of total sales during the last fiscal 
year to sales 3 years ago 
d2/n3 - 
The way the firm was 
established 
Dummy variable for the initial (or after privatization) 
status of the establishment 
ecaq5  
Size of locality dummy Locality size dummy variable a3a - 
Industry Industry dummy (12 sectors) a4b  
Country Country dummy variable a1  
Payments overdue for 
utilities 
Dummy variable if the establishment has currently any 
payments overdue by more than 90 days with utilities 
ecaq52a  
Region  Region dummy a2x  
Year Dummy variable for each year of the survey (2002, 
2005, 2008 and 2009) 
a14y  
Local power sector 
reliability 
Normalized ranking provided by the coefficients of 
regional dummies included in the estimation of a linear 
probability model of the likelihood that access to 
finance is a major or very severe obstacle for a firm 
 - 
Regional mean outages 
number 
Average number of outages reported by firms in each 
region, in the BEEPS 2009 
c7 + 
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Figure 7: Electricity intensity by country, in 2009 
  
Notes: The electricity intensity is expressed as the electric power consumption in Kwh per 
constant 2000 US$. 
Sources: WDI, World Bank, authors’ calculations. 
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